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ChiShing Chen, Taipei / Taiwan
* 
 
A Co-original Approach towards Law-Making in the Internet Age 
 
Abstract: There is an increasing interest in incorporating significant citizen participation into the law-
making process by developing the use of the internet in the public sphere. However, no well-accepted 
e-participation model has prevailed. This article points out that, to be successful, we need critical 
reflection of legal theory and we also need further institutional construction based on the theoretical 
reflection. 
Contemporary dominant legal theories demonstrate too strong an internal legal point of view to 
empower the informal, social normative development on the internet. Regardless of whether we see the 
law as a body of rules or principles, the social aspect is always part of people’s background and 
attracts little attention. In this article, it is advocated that the procedural legal paradigm advanced by 
Jürgen Habermas represents an important breakthrough in this regard.  
Further,  Habermas’s  co-originality  thesis  reveals  a  neglected  internal  relationship  between 
public autonomy and private autonomy. I believe the co-originality theory provides the essential basis 
on which a connecting infrastructure between the legal and the social could be developed. In terms of 
the development of the internet to include the public sphere, co-originality can also help us direct the 
emphasis on the formation of public opinion away from the national legislative level towards the local 
level; that is, the network of governance.
1  
This article is divided into two sections. The focus of Part One is to reconstruct the co-originality 
thesis (section 2, 3). This paper uses the application of discourse in the adjudication theory of 
Habermas as an example. It argues that Habermas would be more coherent, in terms of his insistence 
on  real communication   in  his  discourse  theory, if  he  allowed  his  judges  to  initiate improved 
interaction with the society. This change is essential if the internal connection between public 
autonomy and private autonomy in the sense of court adjudication is to be truly enabled.  
In order to demonstrate such improved co -original relationships, the empowering character of 
the  state-made  law  is  instrumental  in  initiating  the  mobilization  of  legal  intermediaries,  both 
individual and institutional. A mutually enhanced relationship i s thus formed; between the formal, 
official organization and its governance counterpart aided by its associated ‘local’ public sphere. 
Referring to Susan Sturm, the Harris v Forklift Systems Inc. (1930) decision of the Supreme Court of 
the United States in the field of sexual harassment is used as an example.  
                                                           
* Distinguished Professor, College of Law, National ChengChi University, Taiwan; SJD, LLM, University of 
California at Berkeley; MS, Computer Science, University of North Texas, USA.  
1 A substantive theory of co-originality is presented and recommended by Rummens. See Rummens, S., 2006, 
Debate: The Co-originality of Private and Public Autonomy in Deliberative Democracy, The Journal of Political 
Philosophy. Vol. 14:4, pp. 469 –81. This article intends to bring co-originality into the network world of the 
internet based on the model of governance. Governance here refers to regulations that emphasize a bottom- up 
and not top- down approach and a dialogical instead of command and control approach. See Lobel, O., 2004, 
The  Renew  Deal:  The  Fall  of  Regulation  and  the  Rise  of  Governance  in  Contemporary  Legal  Thought. 
Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 89, pp. 342– 470. 2 
 
Using only one institutional example to illustrate how the co-originality thesis can be improved is 
not sufficient to rebuild the thesis but this is as much as can be achieved in this article.  
In  Part  Two,  the  paper  examines,  still  at  the  institutional  level,  how  Sturm  develops  an 
overlooked sense of impartiality, especially in the derivation of social norms; i.e. multi-partiality 
instead of neutral detachment (section 4). These two ideas should be combined as the criterion for 
impartiality  to  evaluate  the  legitimacy  of  the  joint  decision-making  processes  of  both  the  formal 
official organization and ‘local’ public sphere.  
Sturm’s emphasis on the deployment of intermediaries, both institutional and individual, can also 
enlighten the discourse theory. Intermediaries are essential for connecting the disassociated social 
networks, especially when a breakdown of communication occurs due to a lack of data, information, 
knowledge, or disparity of value orientation, all of which can affect social networks. If intermediaries 
are  used,  further  communication  will  not  be  blocked  as  a  result  of  the  lack  of  critical  data, 
information, knowledge or misunderstandings due to disparity of value orientation or other causes. 
The institutional impact of the newly constructed co-originality thesis is also discussed in Part 
Two.  Landwehr’s  work  on  institutional  design  and assessment  for  deliberative  interaction is first 
discussed.  This  article  concludes  with  an  indication  of  how the  ‘local’  public  sphere,  through  e-
rulemaking or online dispute resolution, for example, can be constructed in light of the discussion of 
this article.
2 
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I. Introduction 
The  Internet  is  a  medium  that  provides  users  with  great  autonomy.  Anyone  can  decide 
whether to access the net and when to do so. Anyone can decide with whom he or she wants 
to connect and by what means. Unlike the mass-media where the majority of people can only 
receive information, the Internet is bi-lateral. Communication on the internet is facilitated by 
the computer; the possibilities in the design of both hardware and software need only be 
limited by the human imagination. The internet, therefore, would seem to offer an effective 
public sphere where participants can join freely and exchange ideas and information. This 
should result in enhanced mutual understanding and it would seem to be a natural process to 
                                                           
2 What is more, the persistent judges’ point of view seems to indicate that real dialogs among participants do not 
present the whole picture in discourse theory; any individual discourse participant may also rise up to a public 
role and express to others from the point of view of the whole community. For example, a judge express to the 
public through her decisions. Public autonomy hence does not simply means participating in public opinion-
forming and law-making; it may also point to the occasions where public decision-makers reach their decision as 
well. Ronald Dworkin, once in his speech, explained the idea of sovereign as: any one in her capacity to affect 
others. He meant to point out that equal concern and respect ought to be the sovereign virtue. In other words, 
anyone  making  decisions  affecting  others’  lives  ought  to  proceed  with  equal  concern  and  respect  in  mind. 
Whether there is a need and how to incorporate this role of decision-making into the discourse theory where the 
role of discourse participant reigns is an issue I would like to, but cannot pursue.  3 
submit universally acceptable proposals for certain actions. However, the reality seems to 
paint a different picture; at least for the present.  
In this paper, I will restrict my discussion, especially the theoretical aspects, to the public 
sphere of law-making, specifically, adjudication. I would like to show that if we examine the 
major theoretical developments, such as the discourse theory of Habermas, we will find that 
they lack the dimension that substantially connects the judicial and the social.
3 Habermas’s 
theory is the most likely to accommodate a social point of view
4 since the theory is developed 
on the basis of communicative actions among interactive individuals. 
To illustrate my point, I will use Postema’s three layers of intersection between the law 
and social life where significant coordination problems are experienced. The first layer refers 
to the coordination problems involved in social interactions among law-subjects; the second 
layer refers to those between officials (like judges) and law subjects; the third layer refers to 
coordination problems among officials. Since adjudication is our focus, we will take a closer 
look at the second layer – the relationship between judges and law-subjects.  
Coordination problems on the second layer, according to Postema, refer to the need for 
consistency. There needs to be mutual expectations between the judges and law-subjects so 
that in terms of their understanding of what to expect, there are no surprises. In other words, 
the effectiveness of the law is maintained because the understanding and expectations of the 
law  subjects  about  what  is  legal  is  compatible  with  the  judges’  understanding  and 
expectations.
5 Different legal theories place different emphases on the second layer of the 
coordination problems. 
In the internet age, more channels of communication exist which could improve the 
consistency of the mutual understanding and expectation between the courts and lay peop le. 
In view of this, this article advocates a greater degree of interdependence between officials 
and lay persons and promotes, both theoretically and institutionally, the facilitation of this 
interdependence so that the law-making efforts can be enhanced. I believe this is the best way 
of understanding co-originality even though such interpretation may not be what Habermas 
had in mind. 
 
                                                           
3 I am referring to Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), which will be discussed in later sections. 
Such  empowering  decisions  are  important  for  social  interaction  and  dialog.  This  article  believes  that  it  is 
unfortunate that such empowerment exists only in isolated practice and is ignored by the theory. 
4 I examined another social legal theory of Lon Fuller, please see Chen, C., 2011, Greek Idea of Justice and the 
Contemporary Need to Expand the Internal Legal Point of View, in Liu and Neumann ed., Justice  – Theory and 
Practice, Nomos, pp. 41-59. The discourse theory of Jürgen Habermas is better developed and more complete 
than Fuller’s. I hope the internet could be an opportunity for us to construct the law responsive to our society and 
resolve value conflict legitimately in a discursive sense. 
5 Postema, G., 1982, Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law, The Journal of Legal Studies, 
Vol. 11:1, pp. 165-203; esp. 186-93. To raise the structure of a three-layer coordinating problem involved in law 
making,  Postema  “argue[s]  that  the  law-identifying,  law-applying,  and  law-interpreting  activities  of  both 
officials and lay persons essentially involve a complex form of social interaction  having  the  structure of a 
coordination problem – or, rather, of an interrelated, continuous series or overlapping network of coordination 
problems.” Id., at 187.  4 
II. The Co-originality Thesis  
I  believe  that  the  co-originality  thesis,  central  to  the  discourse  theory,  (with  some 
amendments)  can  resolve  all  the  coordination  problems  in  the  three  layers  of  Postema’s 
analytical framework as discussed in the previous section. In the next section, I will analyze 
and provide a critique of co-originality and elaborate on the possibility of a better version. 
Habermas  introduces  the  thesis  of  co-originality  in  a  series  of  specifications,  each 
followed by a concrete level of the specification.
6 At the conception level, rights in a post -
conventional society, unlike that of Plato’s or Kant’s, do not derive from metaphysics. A post-
conventional society “presuppose[s] collaboration among subjects who recognize one another, 
in  their  reciprocally  related  rights  and  duties,  as  free  and  equal  citizens.”  As  a  result, 
subjective rights and objective laws are co-originally shaped; i.e. mutually generating and 
enhancing. None of them can simply be deduced from metaphysical norms.
7 
The discourse theory removes the omnipresence of metaphysics. This is certainly a giant 
step for mankind. However, the theory need s to be justified by a new scheme. Habermas 
responds with another round of co -originality by demonstrating the co-original relationship 
between moral and civic autonomy. What justifies both is the principle of discourse; 
Just those action norms are valid t o which all possibly affected persons could agree as 
participants in rational discourses. 
What he basically means is that one can only claim moral or civic autonomy through a 
discursive  process  where  equal  participants  join  and  rationally  discuss  the  effec ts  and 
acceptability of their joint decision. The moral and civic sphere delimits the area in which the 
action norms rule; the moral sphere is not limited by time and space while the civic sphere is.
8 
If  one  further  zones  into  the  civic  sphere,  one  finds  a nother  layer  of  the  co -original 
relationship.  
In a post-conventional or modern society, the law is the medium, and the only medium, 
which coordinates the whole of society. If rights are what autonomous citizens grant each 
other, as shown in the first level co-originality, we can further derive civic autonomy in such a 
law-coordinated society by ensuring the addressees of the law in such society must at the 
same time be the addressers of the laws. Habermas calls this the co -originality between the 
principle of democracy and legal code or legal form.
9 
The last level of co-originality, which is most important for our purpose here, is what 
Habermas  describes  as  the  co -originality  between  civic  (public)  autonomy  and  private 
autonomy. Since we are both the addressers and the addressees of the law, we are at the same 
time private persons and citizens. The former refers to us being protected by the law to pursue 
whatever life we see best; the latter refers to our roles in joining the public in the legislative 
                                                           
6  See  Habermas,  J.,  1996,  Between  Facts  and  Norms,  Contributions  to  a  Discourse  Theory  of  Law  and 
Democracy, trans. Rehg, W., MIT; esp. pp. 88-128. 
7 Id., pp. 88-9. 
8 Id., pp. 107-8. 
9 Id., pp. 121-2. 5 
process.  Neither  basic  rights  nor  popular  sovereignty  can  claim  priority  because  they 
complement each other. It also means that we can secure our protection by the law only if we 
can and do participate in the forming of public opinion where legislation is based.
10 
I want to raise an issue associated with th e co-originality thesis. It has to do with the 
seemingly simple circularity nature of the thesis, i.e. we are protected by the law, which is 
enacted by ourselves; or we are legislators of the law that protects us as private persons. The 
reality, however, seems to suggest that few of us can be involved in legislative law -making, 
compared to adjudicative or administrative ones. I want to use adjudicative law -making to 
illustrate my point.
11 
Authentic  communication  is  at  the  very  core  of  Habermas’s  discourse  theory.  The 
performance of all participants of such communication must also demonstrate openness to 
newcomers to the communication. Such openness includes listening to what others have to 
say and being willing to change position in the process of interaction. It requires a frank 
sharing  of  one’s  own  feeling  and  perspectives.  These  informal  and  diffused  networks  of 
communication,  which  can  be  understood  to  be  the  public  sphere,  will  interact  with  and 
influence “formally organized public will and opinion formation processes first embodied in 
the legislative and judiciary complex.”
12  
Based on her exploration of the development of Habermas’s idea of the public sphere, 
Maia believes there is a major transformation of the idea of the public sphere in the writings 
of Habermas; Between Facts and Norms represents a replacement of the bipolar model of 
state  v.  civil  society  in  the  The  Structural  Transformation  of  the  Public  Sphere  by  a 
decentralized network metaphor, where “discursive arenas spread throughout civil society.”
13 
However,  such  a  praiseworthy  adjustment  was  not  fully  reflected  in  Habermas’s 
discussion of his theory of adjudication in Between Facts and Norms. The network model of 
public spheres in today’s society indeed better reflects the reality of the emerging network 
society, where the internet and its associated information technologies represent one of the 
major sources of influence. Such networks in the public sphere are not only much needed, but 
they can also be designed and constructed by multi-disciplinary experts, under the name of e-
participation,  e-government,  e-rulemaking,  etc.  What  is  really  lacking  is  a  well-founded 
theoretical basis to guide the institutional design. The co-originality thesis is one of the best of 
such theories which can reflect and provide the guidance for the transformation. However, I 
                                                           
10 Id., pp. 127. 
11 This article, to me, follows naturally from my previous work which criticizes the theory of adjudication of 
Ronald Dworkin from a social interactive perspective based on Lon Fuller. See Chen, C., 2011. Again, following 
up the point I raised in supra footnote 2, we are not always participants in a discursive process; equally important 
is our capacity to be public servants who need to make decisions affecting others, based on our belief that shows 
all circles of  the society, including the society itself, in its best light. Discourse theory cannot only deal with 
participants of dialogical communities.   
12 Please see the introduction to the book “Between Facts and Norms” in Habermas, J., 1999, Introduction, Ratio 
Juris, Vol. 12:4, pp. 329-35, 33. 
13 Maia, R., 2007, Deliberative Democracy and Public Sphere Typology, Studies in Communication, pp. 69  – 
102, 74. 6 
believe there is significant room for improvement before Habermas’s theory of adjudication 
can live up to a co-originality thesis that can assume the transformation task. 
 
III. Co-original Adjudication 
Habermas’s  theory  of  adjudication  is  controversial,  especially  the  idea  of  application 
discourse  he  adopted  from  Guenther.
14  Habermas  supports  much  of  Dworkin’s  theory  of 
adjudication  but  criticizes  Dworkin’s  judges  for  conducting  monologues.
15  Habermas 
reconstructs the theory of adjudication with his discourse theory.
16 Using the ideas of Klaus 
Guenther, Habermas believes that there are two kinds of discourses involved in adjudication; 
the discourse of validation and the discourse of application. 
“In legal discourses of application, a decision must be reached about which of the valid 
norms is  appropriate in  a given situation whose relevant  features  have been described as 
completely as possible. This type of discourse requires a constellation of roles in which the 
parties (and if necessary government prosecutors) can present all the contested aspects of a 
case  before  a  judge  who  acts  as  the  impartial  representative  of  the  legal  community. 
Furthermore, it requires a distribution of responsibilities according to which the court must 
justify  its  judgment  before  a  broad  legal  public  sphere.  By  contrast,  in  discourses  of 
justification there are in principle only participants.”
17 
In a specific case, no one can foresee all the future developments and the validity of the 
decision  can  never  be  realized.  This  is  because  the  discourse  of  justification  requires 
participation of all the parties affected by the decision regardless of time and space. Two 
qualifications therefore must be the result. 
Firstly, one can only determine the validity of a specific case by considering the relevant 
facts and norms of the case provided by a constellation of the roles  actually involved in 
adjudication, i.e. the application discourse only needs to justify the appropriateness of the 
decision by considering all the aspects voiced by the affected participants of the adjudication. 
                                                           
14 Alexy, R., 1996, Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges: Law's Reconstruction, Justification, 
and Application: Jürgen Habermas's Theory Of Legal Discourse, Cardozo L. Review, Vol. 17, pp. 1027-34 
(Habermas's attitude towards coherence is ambiguous; his theory of principles creates many questions; and the 
idea of the discourse of application is at the same time correct, empty, and easy to misunderstand); Michelman, 
F., 2002, The Problem of Constitutional Interpretive Disagreement: Can “Discourses of Application” Help? In 
Aboulifa, Bookman and Kemp, ed., Habermas and Pragmatism, pp. 113–38, Routledge (reasonable interpretive 
pluralism  poses  problems  for  Habermas’s  constitutional  rule  application  and  renders  his  constitutional 
contractarianism incomplete. Even Habermasian discourse of application deviates somewhat from Guenther; and 
Shih, W., 2003, Reconstruction Blues: A Critique of Habermasian Adjudicatory Theory, Suffolk University Law 
Review, Vol. 36, pp. 331-90 (Habermas's theory does not meet the criteria with which he invalidates other 
theories  of  adjudication,  and  it  cannot  and  does  not  even  meet  his  own  commitments).  But  challenging 
Lefebvre’s reading of Habermas’s theory of adjudication, Peterson believes in the theory of adjudication of 
Guenther,  upon  whom  Habermas  relies  heavily,  norms  are  creatively  generated  or  modified  in  application 
discourses. See Peterson, V., Creativity in Application Discourses, to be published, manuscript on file with the 
author. 
15 Previously, I examined this criticism in detail in Chen, C., 2011, pp. 44, footnote 8 and accompanying texts. 
16 Habermas, J., 1996, pp. 172; 217-9; 229; 231; 235-6. . 
17 Id., 172. 7 
Secondly, the impartial judge, representing the “the perspectives of uninvolved members of 
the community”,
18 merges the application discourse and the justification discourse by using 
the  civil  or  criminal  procedural  codes  to  mitigate  the  strategic  nature  of  the  adversarial 
behavior of the litigating parties. 
Indeed, if we use the same criteria to evaluate the judges of Dworkin and Habermas, we 
would find that they are both conducting monologues, since both of the judges are isolated 
from the society and are dealing, equally impartially, with the case at hand. Dworkin’s judge 
may score more by explicitly admitting related chains of precedents into consideration. In this 
paper, we want to focus on the area to which Habermas
19 did not pay sufficient attention. 
Once improved, we can expect a true thesis of co-originality that is urgently needed to guide 
the development of the network of the public sphere connected to formal institutions, such as, 
but not limited to, courts and administrative agencies.  
The core of the problem in Habermasian theory of adjudication lies in treating judges as 
both participant and decision-maker for the discursive community of the case at hand and the 
representatives of all involved in the social context affected by the decision of the case. I want 
to show that better models for mutual transformation do exist and need to be recognized and 
empowered by the judges. 
A successful example can be found in an American Supreme Court case  – Harris v 
Forklift Systems Inc. (1993)
20(hereinafter, ‘Harris’). This case can be used to show how the 
interaction  between  officials  and  citizens  can  be  improved.  (This  is  Postema’s  type-two 
interaction as discussed in the previous section.)  
In the  case of Harris,  the judges  re-affirmed  an established principle by finding that 
sexual harassment was an instance of discrimination. In addition, Justice Ginsburg elaborated 
a reciprocal test: “[t]he critical issue, as Title VII’s text indicates, is whether members of one 
sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of 
the other sex are not exposed.”  
After the Supreme Court established that sexual harassment constitutes discrimination, 
Harris built on this definition by outlining “a framework that is capable of providing for 
dynamic  interactions  between  general  legal  norms  and  workplace-based  institutional 
innovation.”  At  the  same  time,  the  court  refused  to  substantively  define  what  constitutes 
sexual harassment. It provided affirmative defense for the defendant companies that had done 
their  best  to  institutionalize  an  effective  internal  protection  scheme  to  prevent  sexual 
harassment and fair dispute resolution mechanisms, in cases of real offense. 
Harris is significant and, indeed, could legitimately serve as a demonstrative case where 
court decisions could empower and guide better social interaction to derive social norms by 
establishing  legal  principles  while  not  providing  substance  for  the  construction  of  the 
                                                           
18 Id., 229. 
19 Dworkin too, but this paper will limit the discussion to Habermas. 
20 See supra note 2. 8 
principle. Courts could further provide incentives to the affected parties to actively search for 
outside help to meet the requirement of the law. Such a guideline is significant, since it directs 
attention to the examination of patterns of interaction and to other organizational, social, and 
cultural factors that may twist an interactional pattern into one that is biased but unnoticed. 
In  the  Harris  case  and  subsequent  cases,  the  courts,  while  refusing  to  define  what 
constitutes a hostile environment  of sexual  harassment  have provided companies  with  an 
affirmative defense if they “exercised reasonable care to avoid harassment and to eliminate it 
when it might occur.” Together, the courts have fostered both the need and an incentive for 
companies to open themselves to outside intermediaries, like lawyers, consultants, non-profit 
organizations, and insurance companies: the premise is that this kind of exposure would help 
the companies to institutionally regulate and prevent sexual harassment and the courts have 
encouraged or demanded that companies implement effective procedures for settlement of 
internal  sexual-harassment  claims.  In  this  way,  better  practices  should  become  more 
prevalent,  since  institutional  internal  data  are  accessible  to  intermediaries  who  would 
presumably  be  able  to  fully  understand  the  problem.  The  pooling  and  the  sharing  of 
information, knowledge and experience among intermediaries has also improved society’s 
focus on the issue. 
Using Habermas’s terms, the application discourse (which takes place inside the courts) 
and the justification discourse (which is affected by social dialogue and interaction taking 
place outside the courts) can be mutually enhanced by the courts initiating a relationship 
between the two and providing principled guidance for such interaction. Harris is just one 
model that can be used to establish a successful co-original relationship between the public 
and private sectors, in the sense of court adjudication. Innovative ways to further the co-
originality cause is by no means limited by the Harris model. 
 
IV. Efforts of Institutional Building for Co-originality 
Harris  is  one  institutional  example  that  could  enhance  the  thesis  of  co-originality.  Its 
theoretical  as  well  as  institutional  meaning  is  worth  exploring.  Especially,  for  discourse 
theory, the institutional level is not simply a stage of realization for the theory. Discourse 
theory is critically dependent on the performance intention of and the real communication 
conducted within a dialogic structure that needs to be objectively examined and evaluated.  
“For  the  justification  of  moral  norms,  the  discourse  principle  takes  the  form  of  a 
universalization  principle.  To  this  extent,  the  moral  principle  functions  as  a  rule  of 
argumentation. Starting with the general presuppositions of argumentation as the reflective 
form  of  communicative  action,  one  can  attempt  to  elucidate  this  principle  in  a  formal-
pragmatic fashion.”
21 
                                                           
21 BFN, 109. 9 
Alexy  and  Peczenik  provided  the  concept  of  discursive  coherence.  This  is  worth 
considering as one of the criteria for a structural evaluation of communication.
22 The idea of 
discursive coherence is intended to be an improvement on Dworkin’s idea of coherence,
23 
which may be understood to be deliberative. Dworkin’s theory requires that judges select the 
interpretation that sheds the best light on the law or makes it the most meaningful as a whole. 
This would apply during the stage of selecting relevant precedent sequences for the case at 
hand and later when the judge conducts the argument of justification. 
Discursive coherence  evaluates  the degree of coherence by its  observable supporting 
structure of statements: “The more the statements belonging to a given theory approximate a 
perfect supportive structure, the more coherent the theory.”
24Generally speaking, the more 
that statements support a theory, the more coherent the theory; the longer the chain of reasons 
belonging to  a theory, the more coherent  the theory;  the more statements  belonging to  a 
theory are strongly supported by other statements, the more coherent the theory.
25 
This article believes that these criteria are important to not only gauge the effectiveness 
of authentic communication but also to evaluate the level of legitimacy of the decisions 
reached  from  cl aims  made  during  authentic  communication.  In  the  Harris  model,  the 
communication of different claims would  also be important for judges to consider when 
adjudicating related cases. Certainly, in an internet world, assuming these discussions would 
be conducted over the internet and be accessible to the courts. The institutional design of 
these real communications, whether  an online dispute resolution, e -rulemaking, or for other 
e-participation settings, is being actively pursued in academic circles, as dis cussed in the 
following  sections.  Theoretical  guidance,  like  an  improved  co -originality  thesis,  and 
institutional design principles derived from Harris and discursive coherence are vital for the 
success of these new academic endeavors.  
Sturm’s concept of multi-partiality
26 is also relevant here. Multi-partiality challenges the 
monopoly of detached neutrality as the basis of legitimacy in the legal world. The latter 
represents an aspect of a persistent internal legal premise that  the decision maker, such as  a 
judge, must be detached and neutral to both parties in the case at hand. However, the process 
                                                           
22 See Alexy and Peczenik, 1990, The Concept of Coherence and Its Significance for Discursive Rationality, 
Ratio Juris, Vol. 3, pp. 130-47 (1990). See also Peczenik, A., 1994, Why Shall Legal Reasoning be Coherent? 
ARSP-Beiheft, Vol. 53 pp. 179-84. 
23 Alexy and Peczenik, 1990, 131. 
24 Id.  
25 Id., 131-35; other factors include: number of conclusions which are supported by the same premise belonging 
to the theory in question; number of priority relations between the principles related to the theory; number  of 
reciprocal empirical relations between statements belonging to a theory; number of reciprocal analytic relations 
between  statements  belonging  to  a  theory;  number  of  reciprocal  normative  relations  between  statements 
belonging to a theory; statements without individual names a theory uses; number of general concepts belonging 
to a theory, and the higher their degree of generality; resemblances between concepts are used within a theory; 
concepts a given theory has in common with another theory; number of in dividual cases a theory covers; fields 
of life a theory covers. id., 135-42. 
26  Sturm and Gadlin, 2007, Conflict Resolution and Systemic Change, Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 
2007:3, pp. 1 – 63. 10 
of deriving social norms through the interaction of the public as represented by various groups 
and by individuals as representative of the social world, lacks the relevant legitimacy base. 
Sturm suggests multi-partiality as a possible solution. Certainly, Sturm’s challenge also goes 
deeper.  Not  only  is  detached-neutrality  under  dispute,  but  she  also  confronts  the  unitary 
concept of the law based on a dominant internal legal point of view. Law-making ought to be 
by  the  cooperation  of  and  interaction  between  state-made  laws  and  social  normative 
derivation processes. These two law-making processes are co-original.  
Multiple perspectives do exist in the social world; their existence should be treated as a 
virtue and not a vice. We need an institutional design in which every perspective can be 
considered  and  be  subjected  to  thoughtful  examination.  Such  examination  should  be  an 
obligation. In other words, we could build participatory accountability that requires “ongoing 
examination  and  justification  to  participants  and  a  community  of  practitioners”.
27  It  is 
inevitable  that  these  participants  may  very  well  hold  different  perspectives  due  to  their 
different  professional  experiences,  academic  disciplines,  or  values.  Those  involved  with 
conflict resolution should also “subject their analysis to the scrutiny of their peers and to 
explain  and  justify  their  choices  as  part  of  doing  their  work.”
28  Multi-partiality  therefore 
opens up a new source for the cultivation of public norms; these public norms can derive from 
sources other than the traditional adjudication process.  
 
“They also emerge when relevant institutional actors develop values 
or  remedies  through  an  accountable  process  of  principled  and 
participatory  decision  making,  and  then  adapt  these  values  and 
remedies to broader groups or situations. ADR can play a significant 
role  in  developing  legitimate  and  effective  solutions  to  common 
problems and, in the process, produce generalizable norms.”
29 
 
Another aspect of Sturm’s theory is her contention that the involvement of intermediaries, 
both individual and institutional, is critical. Though more empirical research is needed, it is 
certain that in any community where social dialogue takes place, there will be obstacles. We 
cannot merely hope that multi-partiality will be successful.  
Intermediaries are persons or organizations that function as bridges to connect different 
social networks. They can successfully bridge seemingly dichotomous groups such  as the 
public and the private, the legal and the non-legal, the general and the contextual, and the 
coercive and the cooperative. Intermediaries can serve a vital function because they can pool 
information or knowledge and they can filter the context of the interaction without being 
influenced by embedded cultural, social, or organizational factors. The intermediaries usually 
                                                           
27 Id., 4. 
28 Id. 
29 Id., 3. 11 
build up their working relationships with multiple social networks in the institution. These 
long-standing connections provide the basis for communication and mutual understanding. 
The strength of the intermediaries who work within an organization lies in the fact that they 
can counteract the obstacles such as traditional institutional practices. They have access to 
external intermediaries, whether organizations or individuals, and can pool information, thus 
obtaining cross-contextual perspectives.
30  
One of the deliberative democracy research communities is also actively pursuing the 
institutional  issues  associated  with  deliberative  demo cracy.  At  the  end  of  this  section, 
Landwehr’s recent works
31 is examined based on the discussion in this paper.  
Landwehr first points out that “[t]he success of deliberative democracy has in the last two 
decades shifted the focus of democratic theory, and increasingly also of empirical political 
science, from matters of aggregation and regulation towards communication.”
32 Landwehr 
believes that as decision-making processes always involve both informative and distributive 
aspects, we need to do justice to both discursive and coordinative issues involve in these 
processes. The informative aspects incline the decision-making process towards discourse; the 
decisions reached will inevitably have a distributive impact on the affected people; this tends 
to drive the decision-making process toward coordination. This theory criticizes Habermas’s 
discourse theory as it emphasizes discourse but lacks the coordination dimension. “In rare 
cases, coordination may be achieved through argumentation alone.”
33 
Regarding the discursive dimension, Landwehr prefers  
“to use a notion … that is neither as normatively charged as Habermas’s, which entails 
strong requirements of equality and freedom from coercive power, nor as encompassing as the 
Foucauldian. I suggest to describe interaction as discursive in so far as it has both public and 
dialogical qualities.”
34  
                                                           
30 These discussions of Sturm’s ideas are based on her three empirical studies published in Sturm, S., 2001 
(empirical  study  of  three  major  American  corporations’  effort  to  invite  outside  help  to  build  internal 
infrastructure for sexual harassment prevention and dispute resolution); Sturm, S., 2007 (empirical study of the 
dispute resolution center inside the American Institute of Health (NIH) to resolve internal conflicts); and Sturm, 
S., 2006, the Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher Education, Harvard Journal of 
Law  &  Gender,  Vol.  29:2,  pp.  247-334  (empirical  study  of  the  ADVANCE  program  administered  by  the 
American National Science Foundation (NSF) to advance workplace equity in Higher education). 
31  See Landwehr, C., 2010, Discourse and Coordination: Modes of   Interaction and their Roles in Political 
Decision-Making, The Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 18:1, pp. 101 –22; and Landwehr and Holzinger, 
2010, Institutional Determinants of Deliberative Interaction, European Political Science Review, vol. 2:3, pp. 
373–400. 
32 Landwehr, C., 2010, 101. 
33  By being closer to discourse or coordination, Landwehr describes a total of four ideal -typical modes of 
interaction: discussion, deliberation, bargaining and debate. Id., 102-4.  
34 Id., 105. Baechtiger also finds one type of deliberation research now that is more flexible to the forms of 
dialog,  emphasizing  more  on  outcome  than  process;  unlike  the  deliberation  research  approach  based  on 
Habermasian discursive logics. See Baechtiger, Niemeyer, Neblo, Steenbergen and Steiner, 2010, Symposium: 
Toward More Realistic Models of Deliberative Democracy. Disentangling Diversity in Deliberative Democracy: 
Competing Theories, their Blind Spots and Complementarities, The Journal of Political Philosophy, V ol. 18:1, 
pp. 32–63. 12 
A  less  rigid  discursive  requirement  could,  Landwehr  believes,  provide  room  for 
coordination, where reciprocity based on the basic principle of tit-for-tat reigns.
35  
To develop her balanced approach toward incorporating both discourse and coordination, 
Landwehr conducted an empirical study of two forums in Germany. These were constituted in 
response  to  an  ethical  debate  of  stem -cell  research  which  had  been  triggered  by  a 
neurobiologist at the University of Bonn who submitted a proposal to the German Research 
Foundation in August 2000 for a research project using imported ES cells. One forum was a 
German parliamentary debate, which was celebrated as one of the parliament’s finest hours; 
the other was a citizens’ conference modeled after the Danish consensus conferences. The 
Speech Act Analysis (SAA) techniques were adopted to examine the hypothesis: “[t]he more 
discursive  and  coordinative  communicative  interaction  is,  the  more  preference  change  is 
likely to occur.”
36 
This could be considered to be pioneering research. Landwehr found that the Bundestag 
debate  did  not  qualify  as  discourse  as  it  lacked  dialogical  interaction.  The  sequence  of 
speakers was pre-determined according to the number of signatories and members took turns 
to speak, resulting in the division of speakers and listeners. The content of the speeches was 
typical of public monologue and the speeches were dominated by words such as ‘to ASSERT’ 
and ‘to ESTABLISH’.
37 The citizens’ conference took place after the Bundestag had made the 
decision on the stem-cell matter which significantly reduced the coordinate nature of the 
forum.
38 
In  light  of  the  discussion  of  the  co -originality  thesis  and  associated  institutional 
improvement,  this  article  raises  two  issues  worthy  of  further  investigation.  First,  as 
demonstrated  in  Landwehr’s  study,  legislative  procedures  are  not  ideal  for  empirical 
communicative studies. The maxim for scientific investigation is that if the problem is divided 
into manageable-sized portions, there is a higher likelihood of success. The highly strategic 
and indeterminate nature of legislative issues exacerbates the difficulties of such a study; it is 
difficult to anticipate reasonable results for the accumulation of information. For this reason, 
this  article  focuses  more  on  governance,  especially  the  interaction  between  the  public 
authority  (mainly the courts in  this paper), and its  mutually related public communities. 
Authentic  communication  in  the  local  public  spheres  which  deal  with  better  defined  and 
delimited issues may provide discursive experiences that are easier to analyze. 
Second, the co-original nature of public and private autonomy between courts and its 
social counter-parts, as revealed in this article, may significantly reduce the academic burden 
                                                           
35 Id., 105-7. However, Landwehr also notices a recent change in Habermas to leave more rooms for non-
deliberative  and  non-democratic  modes  of  political  interaction,  so  long  as  the  overall  discursive  structure 
remains  both  deliberative  and  democratic.  Id.,  119.  See  also  the  Habermas’s  work  that  Landwehr  cites: 
Habermas, J., 2006, Does Democracy Still Enjoy an Epistemic Dimension? Communication Theory, Vol. 16, pp. 
411–26. 
36 Id., 381. 
37 Id., 389-90. 
38 This is one of the three factors reducing the level of coordination, see Id., 392. 13 
of analyzing real dialogical communities. To mix the dialogical and coordinative dimensions 
in the study of a forum seems to blur the data by placing the two dimensions in a bipolar 
relationship. It may also be more difficult to exchange interpretations of the findings. In short, 
observing how a group conducts dialogue and how members of the group bargain with each 
other to reach joint decisions tends to lose the focus of our study. 
Actually reaching a decision is not always desirable. If we can find out the structural 
determinants of a true multi-partiality public norm derivation process, we can know whether 
the end result of the political interaction, no matter whether a decision is reached or not, has a 
legitimate  basis.  Alexy  and  Peceznik’s  concept  and  criteria  of  discursive  coherence  have 
made a significant  contribution to our progress in this area. We certainly will debate the 
question of what structural formation provides us with the confidence to affirm the legitimacy 
of the dialogic efforts and to what extent this occurs. It is anticipated that such arguments will 
result in progress.  
The dialogical structural and formal research is especially important for the measurement 
of the legitimacy of the end result reached by the local public spheres. Such research is also 
critical  to  evaluate  further  decisions  made  by  local  authorities,  courts  and  administrative 
bodies in response to the dialogic efforts of social political interactions. An example of this is 
in the context or e-rulemaking. If there is participation on the internet dialogue platform with 
people commenting and arguing about the rule-making proposal of an administrative agency, 
then  the  result  reached  by  the  dialogic  public  ought  to  be  binding  on  the  administrative 
agency which would be obliged to  amend the rule accordingly. In essence, co-originality 
makes us understand that decisions reached by a dialogic community may have two public 
consequences  at  the  same  time;  one  is  internal  in  nature  and  has  to  do  with  whether 
participants of the dialogue ought to accept and follow the decision reached; the other is 
public in terms of the impact of the decision and to what extent it ought to influence or change 
the other, especially formal organizations in their public decision making. There ought to be 
correspondence between the quality of the dialogue and its public influence.
39   
 
V. The Internet and Law-Making -- Conclusion 
Though the introduction of the internet brought tremendously high hopes, so far, it has not 
brought about any major changes at the macro level, compared with other media.
40 From a 
                                                           
39 I hope the discussion here can somewhat relieve Chambers’ concern. See Chambers, S., 2009, Rhetoric and 
the Public Sphere. Has Deliberative Democracy Abandoned Mass Democracy? Political Theory, Vol. 37:3, pp. 
323-50. Chambers raises a legitimate issue regarding mini-publics. “Mini-publics do not replace representative 
democracy, mass elections, or referendum campaigns; they supplement these other mass institutions. Unless we 
have  a  good  grasp  of  how  the  broader  democratic  context  can  be  shaped  to  compliment,  or  at  least  not 
undermine, deliberative experiments then many of the democratic advantages of mini-publics will be lost.” Id., 
331.This paper believes the bottom-up and dialogic approach of the governance model and its associated co-
original  theoretical  as  well  as  institutional  research,  specially  the  formal  and  structural  analysis  of  the 
communication may represent a solid way to complement the mass democracy.  
40 Gerhards and Schaefer, 2010, Is the internet a better public sphere? Comparing old and new media in the USA 
and Germany, New Media & Society, Vol. 12:1, pp. 143–60 (Suddeutsche Zeitung, the Frankfurter Allgemeine, 14 
bottom-up and dialogical point of view, which is what this paper emphasizes, e-participation 
is a general field with multiple approaches and use of different software tools. It is a field that 
is attracting great interests and it is showing rapid development.
41 Applications with a specific 
purpose,  like  e -rulemaking,
42  online  dispute  resolution,
43  e-petitioning,
44  etc.  also  keep 
progressing.
45 It is hoped the theoretical and institutional discussion in this paper can provide 
new thinking toward the development of these fields. 
Overall, it is appropriate for Habermas to coin the discourse theory as a paradigm, 
following his insightful advocacy of a new social movement. This is true because what is 
really needed is a fundamental change in the traditional patterns of thought of  our time. One 
of these is that communicative action is the bedrock of discourse theory. When we consider 
the use of the internet in law-making, we need to commence from the perspective of society 
rather than that of the empire of the law. Using adjudication as an example again, it is best for 
the courts not to hand down substantive and concrete decisions, especially when more social 
interaction is needed, as demonstrated in Harris. Actually, this is exactly Lon Fuller’s theory 
of adjudication; without sufficient human interaction one cannot expect the court to provide 
needed opinions. These opinions are based on arguments derived from legal doctrine which 
serve as the basis for the social order.
46 
What Harris did, following Fuller’s adjudicative theory, was to provide needed guidance 
and create the environment for further social interaction concerning the issues at hand. The 
theory of discursive coherence developed by Alexy and Peceznik, in this context, can be 
developed into a general criterion for the courts. It can be developed for any decision making 
body; public or private, a group or an individual, The criterion would be to determine to what 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
The  Washington  Post  and  The  New  York  Times.  These  are  the  national  quality  dailies  with  the  largest 
circulation in the two respective countries which were selected for the time period from 1999 to 2001, in which 
coverage on human genome research peaked worldwide. Every section of these newspapers is searched. On the 
internet, the same key words are used in the most widely used search engines in the two countries and only the 
top  30  results  from  each  search  engine  are  included  in  the  analysis.  The  results  indicate  that  internet 
communication is not equal to communication in print media.) 
41 Ergazakis, Metaxiotis and Tsitsanis, 2011, A State-of-The-Art Review of Applied Forms and Areas, Tools and 
Technologies for e-Participation, International Journal of Electronic Government Research, Vol. 7:1, pp. 1 -19 
(“[d]uring the past years, the e-Participation landscape has been growing and developing. Currently, there are 
many applied forms and areas of e-Participation. At the same time, there is a growing variety of tools and 
technologies that are available to enhance e-Participation”). 
42 Farina, Newhart, Cardie, and Cosley, 2011, Rulemaking 2.0, Uni versity of Miami Law Review, Vol. 65, pp. 
395-447; Schlosberg, Zavestoski, and Shulman, 2009, Deliberation in E -Rulemaking? The Problem of Mass 
Participation, in Davies and Gangadharan eds., Online Deliberation: Design, Research, and Practice, pp. 133  - 
48, CSLI Publications. 
43 Turel and Yuan, 2010, Online Dispute Resolution Services: Justice, Concepts and Challenges, in Kilgour and 
Eden eds., Handbook of Group Decision and Negotiation, Advances in Group Decision and Negotiation, pp. 425 
- 36, Springer. 
44 Jungherr and Juergens, 2010, The Political Click: Political Participation through E -Petitions in Germany, 
Policy & Internet, Vol. 2:4, pp. 131-65. 
45 It is hard to keep up to date in this fast advancing area. Previously, I reviewed these related areas under  the 
common  idea  of  e -Government.  See  Chen,  C.,  2011,  Digital  Copyright  Law -Making  and  the  Future 
Development of E-government, Soochow Law Review, to be published soon; especially section V., Reflexive 
DMCA and the Future Development of E-Government. 
46 Fuller, L., 1978, the Forms and Limits of Adjudication, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 92, pp. 353-409. 15 
extent the decision-making body can be specific about the required norms for the issues at 
hand,  and  what  ought  to  be  left  for  others  to  develop  further  through  interaction.  The 
legitimacy of such public norms derived through the network of dialogic communities can be 
expected. 
The idea of multi-partiality and Sturm’s intermediaries go hand in hand. Here again, we 
need a basic conceptual change, from an acceptance of the point of views of judges, to the 
perspective of social interaction. Social interaction must always be constructed through the 
aid  of  intermediaries,
47  for reasons of both epistemology and legitimacy. Multi -partiality 
demands that the composition and structure of the intermediaries, both institutional and 
individual,  be  plural  in  background  and  value  orientation.  In  addition,  intermediaries 
themselves are dialogic communities where rules for communicative action equally apply 
internally. 
With these reconstructed ideas of co-originality in mind, some suggestions can be made 
for the further development of e-rulemaking and online dispute resolution. Farina summarizes 
the problems facing current development of e-rulemaking as:  
 
1) Ignorance of the rule-making process;  
2) Lack of awareness that rule-making of interest is going on; and 
3) Information overload from the length and complexity of rule-making materials.
48 
 
Bearing multi-partiality in mind, intermediaries of related perspectives, including government 
officials, may be a better option for reaching the social networks that are interested and 
affected by the rule-making. Leaders, or catalysts, as Sturm c alls them, in the intermediary 
group can communicate and interpret the rules in the languages familiar to their circles of 
influence. They also serve as a bridge, both mutually inside the catalyst groups and for the 
platform-wide dialogue. Again, conflicts   may not always need to be resolved; discursive 
coherence provides a good indication of the level of readiness in terms of reaching decisions 
acceptable to all. Society as a whole is not always ready to solve all kinds of issues at any 
given moment.  
Farina  points  to  another  important  insight  for  the  development  of  online  dispute 
resolution. In order to search for more and better public participation: 
“ODR (online dispute resolution) is largely confined to systems for resolving consumer 
complaints and other financial disputes. Online conflict resolution in the policy area is barely 
nascent. This is an area that may particularly benefit from multi-disciplinary thinking”.
49  
Here,  we  note  another  prevailing  perspective  rooted  in  the  courts  and  internal  legal 
processes; namely adversarialism. ODR, in addition to e-rulemaking, can make a contribution 
                                                           
47 Intermediaries are usually leaders of related fields who have a broader perspective.  
48 Farina C., 2011, 395. 
49 Id., 415. 16 
to the internet world by facilitating the derivation of public norms, directly, and legal norms, 
indirectly. All we need is simply to change our basic pattern of thought to the new paradigm 
based on discourse. In reality, such a shift seems to be a long way off and will take a great 
deal of effort. Hopefully, this article will contribute to a little momentum to facilitate such 
change.  
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